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This paper explores the evaluation of cluster policies designed to support cooperation and 
networking. We examine the case of the long-running Basque policy, where support is 
provided for ‘cluster associations’. We first examine empirically the effects of the cluster 
associations on firm productivity performance, alongside other variables including 
agglomeration and firm behavioural characteristics. The results provide some weak 
evidence for the existence of additionality associated with the policy. We complement this 
empirical work with context-specific knowledge of the policy in question to show that the 
nesting of both empirical and contextual approaches is crucial for effectively evaluating 
such policies.  
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There is widespread acceptance, certainly within Europe, of the need to design policies such 
as cluster policies that nurture and support cooperative relationships among groups of 
firms. Despite this acceptance there remains a shortage of thorough evaluations that enable 
us to understand the impacts of these policies. The intangible outcomes of such policies and 
their systemic character give rise to specific evaluation demands that are difficult to meet 
using any one evaluation technique. In this paper we argue the importance of nesting 
empirical analysis within a contextual understanding of the policy, an approach that is 
applied to the long-standing cluster policy of the Basque Country region of Spain. 
 
Policies designed to nurture and support cooperative relationships between economic 
agents (firms and support organizations) have been increasingly employed during the last 
two decades. This has corresponded both with the rise of systemic concepts of innovation 
(FREEMAN, 1987; LUNDVALL, 1992; NELSON, 1993; COOKE et al., 1998) and with the 
establishment and growing popularity of the ‘cluster’ concept (PORTER, 1990, 1998, 2003; 
SCHMITZ, 1995). Indeed policies designed to nurture and support the development of 
strong clusters of firms and other production-related organisations are today widespread. 
This is despite varied critique around the theoretical and empirical basis of the cluster 
concept (BENNEWORTH and CHARLES, 2001; MARTIN and SUNLEY, 2003; 
LORENZEN, 2005; BELUSSI, 2006; PITELIS et al., 2006). 
 
The theoretical benefits of conscious and unconscious relationships between geographically 
proximate groups of firms are rooted in the work of Alfred MARSHALL (1907, 1919) on 
industrial districts, and have been analysed from a range of different perspectives and 
contexts (PIORE and SABEL, 1984; BECATTINI, 1991; SAXENIAN, 1994; SCHMITZ, 1995). 
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Arguably the most influential figure in the recent and remarkable policy acceptance of the 
cluster concept has been Michael Porter. PORTER (1998, p.199) defines a cluster as “a 
geographically proximate group of interconnected companies and associated institutions in 
a particular field, linked by commonalities and complementarities”, a definition that is 
frequently criticised for its broadness, but one which has found particular favour with 
policy-makers (MARTIN and SUNLEY, 2003). 
 
Cluster policies1 are a classic example of a ‘soft policy’; rather than dealing in subsidies for 
specific production- or innovation- related activities, they focus support on fostering a 
general atmosphere conducive to co-operative relationships between agents. The extent of 
their uptake can be seen in a recent report identifying 69 distinct national cluster policy 
programmes in Europe alone, with regional programmes also found in 17 European 
countries (OXFORD RESEARCH, 2008). Yet for a policy focus with such wide extension 
there is a shortage of analysis evaluating the effectiveness of individual policies in meeting 
their specified aims (usually defined in terms of productivity, competitiveness, employment 
generation, etc.). In part this is due to the inherent methodological difficulties in evaluating 
cluster policies, whose direct outcomes are usually intangible (e.g. wider space for debate on 
common business issues that may lead to proper solutions in the long term, higher 
generalized trust and social capital, significant knowledge spillovers from cluster policy to 
non-associated companies and to other agents unrelated to the specific cluster). It is also 
due to the sheer variety of specific policies that fit within this broad policy family, rendering 
generalisation of results and implications extremely difficult.2 
 
Policies oriented towards stimulating cooperative relationships are typically rooted in an 
array of industrial, regional, science and technology or development policies. Cluster 
policies are no exception, and the reality of the policy legacy in many places is a mix of 
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policies with ‘cluster elements’ rather than a dedicated/pure cluster policy (OECD, 2007; 
Borrás & Tsagdis, 2008; PARRILLI et al., 2008). Moreover, cluster policies occur within a 
general policy environment in which a multitude of policies directed by governments at 
different geographical scales interact together.  
 
There are therefore specific demands in evaluating cluster policies. On the one hand there is 
a need to combine different evaluation approaches. Given the above-mentioned difficulties 
and the systemic character of policy, as SCHIEMEDEBERG (2010; p.404) concludes, “using 
only a single evaluation method will provide a very limited view on the cluster policy 
programme”. This makes it critical to choose a combination of evaluation methods that 
together are appropriate for the specific evaluation question. On the other hand, there is 
need to recognise that cluster policies generate non-measurable impacts (in the short term), 
and indeed that in some cases the most significant effects of these policies are produced in 
non economic spheres (DIEZ, 2002; FROMHOLD-EISEBITH and EISEBITH, 2005, 2008). 
This paper seeks to respond to these two needs. A combination of empirical analysis and 
context-specific knowledge of the policy in question provides a basis for discussing both 
tangible and intangible outcomes of policy as well as its systemic character. 
 
Our contribution is based around an examination of one of the longest-standing cluster 
policies. The Basque Country region in Spain was a pioneer in adopting a Porterian 
approach to promoting clusters in the early 1990s, and has maintained a cluster policy to 
this day. Specifically, and like many other cluster policies, support exists for the 
establishment and operation of a series of Cluster Associations (CA). Our analysis has two 
parts. We first undertake an empirical study to explore the direct effects on firm 
performance (measured in productivity and productivity growth) of: (i) association 
membership (which can be related to the policy); and (ii) agglomeration (which can be 
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related to firm location decisions based on the importance of external economies). We also 
include here the driver (iii) ‘policy targets’ for selected priorities defined within the Basque 
autonomous region (e.g. innovation and quality management measured through R&D 
expenditure and ISO certifications), and (iv) a few standard and observable control 
variables at the firm level such as age of company, employment level and legal status. The 
results provide some evidence that members of CAs have larger productivity and 
productivity growth than non-members of CAs. We then complement this empirical work 
with context-specific knowledge of the policy in question as a means to include also relevant 
qualitative inputs and outcomes (e.g. mutual effects between cluster policy and other 
business promotion programmes, knowledge spillovers from activities developed by CAs to 
non-associated firms). We argue that the nesting of both empirical and contextual 
approaches is crucial for effectively evaluating cluster policies.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we provide theoretical background on 
clusters and the basis for cluster policies, and discuss their evaluation.  Section 3 then 
outlines the Basque cluster policy and previous attempts to evaluate its effectiveness. 
Section 4 presents the empirical study, and section 5 is dedicated to a contextual discussion 
of these results that highlights the limitations of the exclusive use of statistical approaches 
to evaluating cluster policies. Finally, we make some concluding comments on future lines 
of research in section 6. 
 
2. THEORETICAL PREMISE AND EVALUATION OF CLUSTER POLICIES 
 
2.1 Clusters and Cluster Policies  
The theoretical premise for the benefits of industrial clusters has its deepest roots in the 
seminal study of agglomeration economies of MARSHALL (1907, 1919). Since then 
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economists have tried to explain the effects derived from geographic concentration of 
economic activity. Following GLAESER et al. (1992), it is common to distinguish between 
‘Marshall-Arrow-Romer (MAR)’ and ‘Jacobs’ externalities. MAR externalities occur because 
the concentration of a specific industry within a geographic area facilitates knowledge 
spillovers across firms (lower costs of communication and transactions), while Jacobs 
externalities are based on inter-industry knowledge externalities, which are most likely to 
appear in large and diverse urban areas. There is a large empirical literature that has 
analysed various aspects of agglomeration impacts in terms of both Jacobs and MAR 
externalities. See, for example: GLAESER et al., (1992); AUDRETSCH and FELDMAN 
(1996); PACI and USAI (2000); DURANTON and PUGA (2001); GREUNZ (2004); 
MARTIN et al. (2008b); SPENCER et al., (2009). 
 
Clusters are not simply an agglomeration concept however. Agglomeration per se implies 
potential costs as well as hypothesised benefits; congestion of infrastructure use and labour 
market pressures are two clear examples of negative externalities. Moreover the benefits 
require more than agglomeration. They rely on cooperation between agents to acquire 
competitive advantages; for example, sharing the costs of input purchases or risky 
innovation projects, or joint access to finance or international markets. Credit and export 
consortia, production cooperatives, etc. provide examples (PIORE and SABEL, 1984; 
BECATTINI, 1991; SCHMITZ, 1995). Moreover innovation is increasingly recognised as 
being network-oriented, i.e. rooted in complex processes of interactions and cooperation 
among a variety of actors within the innovation system (suppliers, competitors, employees, 
customers/users, research institutions, regulatory bodies and so on) (VON HIPPEL, 1988; 
FREEMAN, 1991; LUNDVALL, 1992; POWELL et al., 1996). 
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These considerations create a persuasive rationale for policies that are focused on 
facilitating co-operative network relationships. Indeed, based on these theoretical premises 
(i.e. agglomeration economies and cooperation), alongside well-known success cases such 
as the Italian industrial districts (PIORE and SABEL, 1984; BECATTINI, 1991) and Silicon 
Valley (SAXENIAN, 1994), policy-makers have seized in particular upon PORTER’s (1990, 
1998, 2003) neat packaging of the ‘cluster’ concept. An increasing number of authorities at 
supra-national, national, regional and even local level have integrated the ‘cluster’ concept 
into their policy discourse (OECD, 1999; 2007; ISAKSEN and HAUGE, 2002; SÖLVELL et 
al., 2003; MARTIN and SUNLEY, 2003; PITELIS et al., 2006; NAUWELAERS and 
WINTJES, 2008; BORRÁS and TSAGDIS, 2008). Complementarily, the plethora of cluster 
policies has been supported by the devolution processes that many countries are 
experiencing and the increasing private/public collaboration in projects derived from EU 
structural funds (LAGENDIJK and CONRFORD, 2000; RODRÍGUEZ-POSE and GILL, 
2003).  
 
Many cluster policies are built around the policy tool of establishing and/or supporting 
institutions for collaboration (IFCs). Here financial, infrastructural and/or technical 
support is given for the formalisation of cooperative relationships between agents in some 
form of association or network. Such institutions are of course not only associated with 
cluster policies; some have long been present in the form of trade associations, 
entrepreneurial networks, industry associations, etcetera. Cluster initiatives, or cluster 
associations, represent a particular form of IFC in which groups of firms, research and 
educational institutions, government agencies, and others come together to improve the 
competitiveness of a specific, geographically-bound ‘cluster’ of productive activities 
(PORTER and KETELS, 2009). Cluster initiatives can be initiated by companies, 
universities, or government agencies, but research indicates that their success depends on 
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the active involvement of all agents in setting and pursuing an agenda, rather than on who 
initiated the effort (SÖLVELL et al., 2003; AHEDO, 2004; PARRILLI, 2004; FROMHOLD-
EISEBITH and EISEBITH, 2005, 2008; ARANGUREN ET AL., 2009). 
 
2.2 Cluster Policy Evaluation 
Given the growth of these policies, the evaluation and monitoring of the management of 
cluster associations has become a key topic (TERSTRIEP, 2007). Such evaluation is 
important because cluster association initiatives have limited resources, both in human and 
financial terms, and they need to strategically prioritise their activities. Evaluation of cluster 
associations also plays an important legitimisation role, both within the cluster of firms and 
externally among policy-makers. However, the evaluation of the impacts of the cluster 
policies themselves in terms of their stated aims and objectives is less developed: see 
SCHMIEDEBERG (2010) for an overview.  
 
While evaluation of public policies is widely acknowledged as critical in enabling better 
decision-making processes and ensuring future policy effectiveness (TUROK, 1990; 
RAINES, 2002; STOREY 2000, 2004; OCDE, 1999, 2007; NAUWALAERS AND WINTJES, 
2008; BORRÁS and TSAGDIS, 2008; PARRILLI, 2008), problematically cluster policies 
face distinct challenges in their evaluation. The tangible outcomes that can be explicitly 
linked to the financial inputs of many policies are frequently absent in policies that focus on 
facilitating collaboration. Thus their evaluation is more of a tool for ongoing improvement 
than an ex-post control of whether the policy assistance led to a specific outcome. Indeed, in 
a context of overlapping policies evaluation can support the better integration of different 
processes, generating constant feedback for agents that will improve the real outcomes of 




The continuous adaptation of policies to socio-economic reality is particularly relevant in 
regional policy-making, where aspects such as trust, social capital, and system connectivity 
are both central and complex in terms of cause-effect relationships (ASHEIM, 2010). Here 
the difference between ex-post and continual evaluation processes is crucial, because while 
ex-post evaluation is summative in nature (it tries to measure policy effects and impacts), 
ongoing evaluation processes are formative in nature (enabling policy-learning through the 
lifespan of the policy). Corresponding with the evolution from classical conceptions of 
policy towards more systemic ones, evaluation should also evolve to dynamic processes of 
interaction with and feedback from the targeted agents, so as to facilitate reflection and 
continuous policy adaption.  
 
This creates an additional challenge for academic analysis of the impacts of cluster policies: 
how to integrate traditional empirical techniques for analysing tangible impacts (policy 
additionality), with contextual elements capable of providing a wider understanding of the 
effects of the policy? In fact, the relevance of contextual elements is justified by the 
existence of organizational, social, institutional and cultural inputs that may produce 
meaningful effects only in the long-run. However, while both approaches give important 
insights, they are rarely treated together. Most academic analyses evaluating cluster policies 
have focused on one or the other; typically either case studies highlighting contextual 
elements (see for example: PARRILLI, 2004; PITELIS et al., 2006; ARANGUREN et al., 
2008; BORRAS and TSAGDIS, 2008) or evaluations seeking to quantify direct effects in 
terms of a specific ‘hard’ outcome (see for example: HUGGINS, 2001; MCDONALD et al., 
2007; MARTIN et al., 2011a; 2011b; DE LA MAZA et al., 2012). The reality of cluster 
policies, however, is that the relationships between tangible and intangible effects are 
extremely difficult to de-limit. As a consequence, while analyses showing tangible, 
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quantifiable additionality are attractive to policy-makers seeking to legitimise their policies, 
such analyses can be misguided if they occur in isolation without a contextual appreciation 
of the policy. 
 
2.3. Analytical strategy 
This paper attempts to show that the inherent complexities in evaluating cluster policies 
necessitate the integration of empirical and contextual understanding. The first step 
consists of focusing analysis on a particular geographical context, in this case the cluster 
policy implemented since the early 1990s in the Basque Country region of Spain, which is 
introduced in the next section. This is an important departure point because all of the 
clustered firms in the area receive a homogeneous policy treatment. 
 
The second step in the analytical strategy is to formalise a theoretical model to be tested 
with firm-level data. Given that the stated overall aim of the cluster policy is to increase the 
competitiveness of the Basque Country, and following PORTER’s (1990; p. 84) argument 
that “only meaningful concept of competitiveness at national level is productivity”, 
specifically the capacity of “companies to achieve high levels of productivity – and to 
increase productivity over time”, the objective variable is firm competitiveness measured as 
both productivity level and productivity growth. This will be modelled as a function of a set 
of variables including cluster policy, geographical agglomeration, industry, and distinctive 
firm characteristics. Equation 1 specifies the basic theoretical model.3 
 
Equation 1 
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After an empirical analysis of the impacts of the cluster policy, the final step in the 
analytical strategy is to return to a consideration of the context through a reflective analysis 
of the results in the light of a set of qualitative knowledge about the functioning of the 
policy. 
 
3. CASE CONTEXT: BASQUE CLUSTER POLICY 
 
At the beginning of the 1990s the Basque Country was in a process of economic decline. Its 
industry mostly competed on cost, a competitive advantage that was now in danger, 
particularly in the light of the impending consolidation of a common European market. 
Policy responses were sought to construct new competitive advantages, and in particular 
the Basque government pioneered in, together with Catalonia (Spain) and Scotland (UK), 
the establishment of a Porterian cluster policy that is still in operation today (BROWN, 
2000; KETELS, 2004).  
 
The specified aim of the Basque cluster policy is the improvement of the competitiveness of 
firms and the region through cooperation in strategic projects related to three main areas: 
technology, quality management and internationalisation. This is operationalised by the 
Department of Industry, Trade and Tourism (DITT) through support for Cluster 
Associations (CAs). These are institutions for collaboration whose main objective is to 
improve each cluster’s competitiveness by facilitating and fostering 
cooperation/collaboration among their members, including firms, R&D centres, 
universities, government and so on. Today there are 11 priority CAs supported by the DITT, 
alongside a 12th supported by the Department of Transport (table 1).  
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
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Tentative efforts to evaluate the effectiveness of the cluster policy in the Basque Country 
were first made in 1998, when the DITT initiated a policy reflection process. AHEDO 
(2004) analysed these first evaluation steps and identified three main conclusions. Firstly, 
it had been an adequate industrial policy with regards prioritising public resources. 
Secondly, there had been a low level of mergers and strategic alliances, but an important 
increase in inter-firm relations (e.g. export consortiums and R&D projects). Finally, the 
associated firms were not inclined to self-finance the whole budget of the CA activities and 
hence continued public aid was regarded as necessary. 
 
Simultaneously, a new line of research on policy evaluation was initiated by ARANGUREN 
and NAVARRO (2003), leading to a series of research projects defined by a group of 
researchers in cooperation with the DITT and some CAs (see ITURRIOZ et al., 2006; 
ARANGUREN et al., 2008; ARAGÓN et al., 2010; ARAGÓN et al., 2012a, 2012b). These 
projects have complemented other assessment instruments, such as the required annual 
planning and control process of the CAs. The studies have employed a range of 
methodological approaches to evaluation, and limitations of each have confirmed the 
importance of measuring both the tangible and intangible impacts of policy-supported CAs 
on firms’ competitiveness so as to generate a holistic understanding of the policy.  
 
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: SEARCHING FOR DIRECT ADDITIONALITY EFFECTS 
 
The aim in this section is to establish the additionality (or not) of this policy in terms of its 
specific aim of improving the competitiveness of the firms that form the CAs. We undertake 
a comparative analysis of the population of supported and non-supported firms in terms of 
their productivity performance. We analyse descriptive statistics and then estimate 
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regression models to determine the impacts of cooperation (in this case ‘association 
membership’) and agglomeration, controlling for other variables that may determine 
individual firm productivity performance. In doing this we employ two types of samples: 
one representing the total firm population, and one using a ‘matching’ process. Following 
SCHMIEDEBERG (2010, p. 399), “the matching sample is a quasi-simulation approach that 
tries to overcome the shortcomings of observational data by building ‘twin’ pairs of treated 
and non-treated elements”. Estimating a propensity score (ROSENBAUM and RUBIN, 
1983), this procedure assigns to each ‘supported firm’ a ‘non-supported firm’ with similar 
observable characteristics. After this step the subsamples of treated and non-treated firms 
should be comparable, “so that the average treatment effect on the treated firm can be 
estimated” SCHMIEDEBERG (2010, p. 399). 
 
4.1 Construction of the sample and matched sub-sample 
Our dataset is constructed from a combination of two information sources: the SABI-
Informa database (economic results from Spanish firms) and the DIRAE database 
(economic activity directory from EUSTAT, the Basque Statistical Institute). The list of CA 
members is comprised of firms that joined CAs in 2002 or earlier. We selected information 
for two years (2002 and 2008). This is a period of relatively stable growth across the whole 
economy, implying similar conditions for all firms. It is also a period in which the selected 
CAs had already become relevant agents within their production systems; hence a mature 
stage of the policy. Geographically, our data covers the three provinces and 20 counties of 
the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country. In terms of economic activity, we 
consider firms belonging to sectors that correspond with those supported by the cluster 
policy (see Table 2). 
 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
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Information about the cluster policy and the members of each CA is public. We merged the 
list of members of the 12 cluster associations with the aforementioned databases. In 20o2 
the total sample contains 5525 observations, but there are only 3432 observations in 2008. . 
With regards members of the CA we observe 176 firms in 2002 and 127 in 2008. 
Consequently, their likelihood of survival is 72,15%, 10% larger than the rest of the sample 
(61,77%). Given that the survival rate of CAs firms is larger than their non-CA counterparts, 
the sample at the end of the period (2008) under-represents unsuccessful non-CAs. 
Therefore, a simple OLS regression of labour productivity (or labour productivity growth) 
on cluster membership will lead to downward-biased estimates. Furthermore, a simple OLS 
would incur in a loss of 2,093 observations.  The risk of biased estimates and the loss of 
information that entails the use of the OLS will be addressed through the implementation of 
a Heckmann (1979) sample selection model. This method will also provide statistical 
validity (or not) for the higher survival rate of CAs in comparison with non-CAs.  
 
We collected data using processes that were as consistent as possible in order to obtain 
comparable information about clustered and non-clustered firms. However, some biases in 
terms of size, location or distribution could arise between both samples. In order to evaluate 
the importance of those biases we performed a probit regression, using CA membership as 
the dependent variable. As explanatory variables we included the logarithm of firms’ 
employment and age in 2002, a set of dummy variables describing whether firms are 
developing R&D or quality standards, the sector and location in which firms operate and 
their juridical form.4 The model is significant (LR Chi2 = 474.42, prob >Chi2 = 0.000), the 
pseudo-R2 equals 0.307, and most of the explanatory variables are significantly different 
from zero. Moreover, following propensity score-matching literature, we estimated the 
matching scores from the probit (Leuven and Sianesi, 2003) and used the nearest 
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neighbour without replacement methodology (Deheija and Wahba, 2002) to identify 
comparable pairs. The matching was carried out by choosing the caliper that assured 
sufficient proximity between pairs. More precisely, we required the difference of propensity 
scores between groups to be non-significant as long as we kept the maximum number of 
firms in the sample. When the caliper is 0.40, the average propensity scores for clustered 
and non-clustered firms are 0.245 and 0.210 respectively. We could not reject the null 
hypothesis that they were equal (p-value = 0.215). This matched sub-sample contained 240 
firms, 120 of each type. Performing the probit again with the sub-sample, the model 
becomes insignificant (LR Chi2 = 10.43, prob >Chi2 = 0.999), the pseudo-R2 equals 0.032, 
and the explanatory variables are statistically not different from zero. This procedure 
establishes a high confidence in the results achieved in the full sample and the matched 
sub-sample. 
 
4.2 Data Analysis 
The overall objective is to measure how firm productivity is influenced by the most relevant 
cluster drivers: agglomeration economies5, cooperation (‘association membership’), and 
behaviour in the areas in which cluster policy is designed to make a difference (innovation, 
analyzed here through presence of R&D activities, and quality, analysed here by ISO 
certifications in TMQ and EMQ).6 The age, employment level, legal structure and industry 
of firms are also controlled for. Table 3 provides an explanation of all variables. A 
descriptive analysis is first undertaken to identify the different characteristics of firms that 
are members of CAs vis-a-vis firms that are not. Table 4 presents basic descriptive statistics 
(mean and standard deviation) for these two groups of firms.  
 
[TABLES 3 AND 4 ABOUT HERE] 
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We can observe from both samples that associated firms are on average significantly larger 
than non-associated firms, and demonstrate higher productivity both in 2002 and in 2008. 
Moreover, the absolute increment in productivity is also higher among associated firms, as 
is relative productivity growth. With regard to the behaviour measures, the two groups of 
firms in both samples show substantial differences in propensity to undertake R&D and 
adoption of ISO certification (TMQ and EMQ). In the total sample, associated firms achieve 
double or more of the results of non-associated firms. Differences between associated and 
non-associated firms in the matching sample are also substantial. This variation may be 
interpreted in different ways. It might be that technology-based firms are more likely to join 
CAs, possibly due to higher absorptive capacity which helps them reap higher benefits from 
interactions with other companies in the cluster. Alternatively or complementarily, this 
outcome might be explained by the fact that larger firms tend to associate, possibly for a 
series of advantages that they want to achieve in cooperation (e.g. controlling the local 
market or improving coordination in the value chain). 
 
4.3 Econometric analysis 
The aim of the econometric analysis is to isolate the impact of being a CA member, as 
opposed to agglomeration and other factors, on firms’ productivity performance. The 
empirical models are based on the theoretical premises discussed in section 2 and the 
Basque cluster policy context introduced in section 3. With this analysis we will be able to 
detect patterns at the beginning and end of our observation period and, most critically, the 
evolution in performance between 2002 and 2008. With regards evolution we run 
regressions for both absolute and relative change. The following four models are therefore 
estimated:  
 
Equation 2 (OLS for full and matched sub-sample) 
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Equation 3 (Heckman for full sample and OLS for matched sub-sample) 
                                                     
                                                           
                                            
Equation 4 (Heckman for full sample and OLS for matched sub-sample) 
                            
                                                         
                                                            
                                             
Equation 5 (Heckman for full sample and OLS for matched sub-sample) 
       
                   
        
  
                                                             
                                                            
                            
 
Where i represents each firm and εi is the error term. It is worth mentioning that the 
assumption of independence and equal variance between the error terms would not hold if 
some firms systematically used unobserved inputs in excess of the average. This may lead to 
potential misspecifications of coefficient values (HUBER, 1967, WHITE, 1982). Moreover, 
our dataset has a multilevel nature as long as some of the explanatory variables are 
measured at county level. This can induce downward biased standard errors. We control for 
all those biases applying clustered (by county) robust (to Heteroskedacity) standard errors 
(WOOLDRIDGE, 2003). The results from estimating these four empirical models for the 
two samples are reported in Tables 5 and 6. 
 
[TABLES 5 and 6 ABOUT HERE] 
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In the case of the full sample, where we perform OLS for Equation 2 and Heckman’s (1979) 
selection model for Equations 3, 4 and 5, the R2 ranges from 0.05 to 0.12 . In the first stage 
(Probit) of the regressions run with the Heckman selection model we included cluster 
membership, age of the firm in 2002, labour size in 2002 and sector dummies. The Lambda 
Mills is not statistically significant which implies that there is not significant relation 
between the fact of survival until 2008 and the predicted productivity and productivity 
growth.  
 
In all the models of the full sample the CLUSTER variable is positive and significant in the 
regressions related to both absolute and relative changes in productivity. Thus there are 
differences in the average productivity performance between CA members and non-
members that appear as significant when controlling for other variables. In addition the 
results of the Heckman selection model indicate that members of the CA have significantly 
more likelihood of survival than non CA members. Overall, this evidence could be 
interpreted as indicative of additionality (in labour productivity and survival) from the 
policy. The industrial agglomeration (INDAGG) variable is positive in the absolute change 
and negative in the relative change regression, and in both cases is not statistically 
significant in explaining differences in productivity across firms in the period 2002-2008, 
while sectoral agglomeration (SECAGG) is negative and not significant in both cases. Firm 
behaviour with regards R&D and quality management (TMQ and EMQ) does not appear to 
be significant in determining changes in firm productivity, and the same happens with the 
variables of labour cost and GDP per capita. In the case of R&D, technical (TMQ) and 
environmental (EMQ) activities have a negative sign in both the absolute change regression 
and the relative change regression.  
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The results of the matched sub-sample have a larger explanatory capacity (the R2 ranges 
from 0.18 to 0.61) and can be interpreted in a similar way. The productivity level regression 
from 2002 indicates that there was no self-selection effect at the beginning of the period, 
while in the 2008 regression the CLUSTER variable is positive and significant. When 
applying regressions to the absolute and relative models, there are positive signs but there 
is no statistically significant effect from belonging to a CA. The difference is higher in the 
relative change model. Again the sectoral agglomeration (SECAGG) variable is found to be 
negative although not significant for the period 2002-2008, while industrial agglomeration 
(INDAGG) demonstrates positive and not significant values. In terms of the effects of the 
firm behaviour variables on productivity changes: the R&D, technical management (TMQ) 
and environmental quality (EMQ) variables have a negative effect in both regressions, 
although they are not significant. Regarding (county) labour cost the sign of the variable is 
negative and significant in both absolute and relative labour productivity regressions, 
suggesting that productivity growth is higher in those counties where labour cost is low. 
Finally, the GDP per capita in each county is positively linked to changes in productivity. 
 
The key question asked from this type of statistical analysis is to what extent the cluster 
policy demonstrates additionality that justifies public intervention. On this question the 
results deliver weak positive evidence regarding effects on labour productivity growth. 
While the overall positive effect of belonging to a CA is supported consistently by different 
specifications and samples, the changeable nature of signs and significance on many 
variables highlight the caution with which such analysis should be treated. Indeed, in 
general the results related to the variables analysed do not seem particularly significant or 
steady over time. Moreover, definite conclusions on additionality in the case of such 
relationship-driven policies are difficult to reach precisely because the systemic and tacit 
nature of the policy means that it cannot be entirely captured by the indicators available. 
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Thus while the results presented are an important input into the evaluation of such a policy, 
they should be positioned alongside other inputs. We turn in the next section to a detailed 
discussion of these limitations through a qualitatively-informed contextual analysis of what 
may be happening in the case of the Basque cluster policy.  
 
5. CHALLENGES IN INTERPRETING THE IMPACTS OF CLUSTER POLICIES: A 
CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF THE BASQUE CASE  
 
There are inherent difficulties in evaluating the impacts of cluster policies. These are 
illustrated by the empirical analysis of the previous section and evidenced by the lack of 
robust formal analysis of such policies to date in the literature. The difficulties arise for two 
key reasons. Firstly these policies are focused above all on qualitative relationships, dealing 
with intangible changes in behaviour. Cluster policies are generally designed to promote 
(the benefits of) co-operation, alongside competition, between groups of firms and related 
institutions. Their focus is on relationships, and on their underlying determinants such as 
trust and social capital. So, unlike in ‘harder’ policies (e.g. financial subsidies; investment in 
infrastructures), the relationship between policy inputs, intermediate outputs and expected 
policy outcomes is unclear and extremely difficult to delimit statistically. Secondly, we are 
dealing with systemic policies that interact at different levels and in broader frameworks, 
such as systems of innovation. Interactions and interdependencies among different 
components of clusters and innovation systems, for example, are crucial for the 
development of systemic learning processes.  
 
We are left with the challenge of how to overcome these difficulties in making a broad 
assessment of how well distinct policies within a given system are contributing to the overall 
development of that system. While empirical analysis such as that of the previous section, 
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or the ones conducted recently by MARTIN et al. (2011a, 2011b), can provide an important 
background to the functioning of an individual policy, on its own it cannot be pushed too far 
in making precise impact assessments given the systemic and intangible characteristics of 
the policy. As such, cluster policies require a broader evaluation approach than that 
presented in the previous section. Specifically, evaluation should be seen more as a tool for 
ongoing improvement and adjustment rather than as an ex-post control of whether the 
policy assistance led to a specific outcome.  
 
These arguments can be illustrated in the Basque case through a contextual analysis of a 
series of factors that should be considered alongside the empirical analysis presented 
previously. This is based on accumulated academic and consultancy knowledge over two 
decades of cluster development and policy in the Basque Country. Due to its systemic 
nature, we underline at least three areas that imply important contextual considerations to 
complement the former empirical analysis. 
 
1. There could be impacts and results within clusters that are caused by different 
factors. So it is difficult to assign the impacts only to the cluster policy.  
 
To evaluate the impact of a policy, it is first necessary to know the aims of the policy. 
Evaluation should be related to the kind of additionality that the policy wants to generate. 
The Basque cluster policy aims at improving the cluster associations’ members’ 
competitiveness through cooperation. So it seeks to generate output additionality through 
behavioral additionality (GEORGHIOU, 2004). Implicitly, competitiveness is understood as 
productivity. The first key problem with the evaluation of the policy therefore concerns the 
multidimensional factors that affect firm productivity and competitiveness. There are a 
wide variety of factors that influence the productivity levels and growth trajectories of firms; 
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in this sense, being associated is only one of multiple factors. So, there are challenges in 
establishing a cause-effect relationship between the policy and any increase in 
competitiveness, requiring a wider appreciation of potential relationships.  
 
The descriptive statistics presented in section 4 show that the productivity level of 
associated firms is higher than that of non-associated firms in both 2002 and 2008, as is 
both the absolute and relative productivity growth between these two years. Moreover firms 
within the CAs are shown to be more likely to invest in R&D and to have technical and 
environmental quality certificates. This is in line with earlier findings in the Basque context. 
ARAGÓN et al. (2010), for example, compare the performance of associated-firms in two 
specific CAs with a control group of non-associated firms. Here, significant differences were 
found in areas of internationalisation, quality management certificates and R&D 
expenditure (with better performance of associated-firms), although no differences were 
detected in terms of economic profitability. Also in the Second Competitiveness Report of 
the BASQUE INSTITUTE OF COMPETITIVENESS (2009), indicators of growth of sales 
(2003-2006), internationalization and innovation for the associated firms of all Basque CAs 
are compared with the mean of these indicators for the Basque manufacturing sector. The 
conclusion is that in all indicators associated firms perform better than non-associated 
ones.  
 
Combining this evidence it is possible to build a strong case for positive impacts from the 
cluster policy: there are a series of symptoms suggesting that associated firms perform 
better than non-associated ones. Moreover, this impact is supported by the econometric 
analysis, where the positive and significant sign on the CLUSTER variable in several of the 
regressions suggests additionality in productivity performance from associating to a CA. 
What is more difficult, however, is to be categorical with regards to the direction of causality 
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that leads to this apparent additionality. Indeed, our contextual knowledge of the policy and 
firms involved would suggest that the relationship runs in the inverse sense: firms that 
perform better in these various indicators are those most likely to associate to cluster 
associations, in part through pressure from policy-makers in promoting the policy among 
these firms (e.g. policy-makers, who avail of detailed statistics on business performance, 
invited these firms to associate before inviting any other firms). Thus care should be taken 
in making a straightforward interpretation on cause-effect additionality.  
 
2. There could be other benefits from the cluster policy - different from those that can 
be specified in a formal model - that will be generated thanks to its systemic nature. 
 
Firstly, there are difficulties in separating the impact of CA activities on the competitiveness 
of associated firms with spillover impacts on non-associated firms. For instance, if the CA 
works to improve the provision of training and skills, it generates positive effects not only 
for associated firms, but also for non-associated firms located in the Basque Country. This 
can be seen in the case of the Aeronautics CA, which develops aeronautics engineering 
modules in a joint project with the Engineering School in Bilbao. In addition, there could be 
knowledge spillovers to non-associated firms based on the development of new technologies 
or innovations; these may be developed through cooperation among CA members, and 
transferred to other firms through user-producer relationships.  
 
Secondly, and less obviously, cluster policies can generate a series of other indirect benefits. 
For instance, in the context of the Basque cluster policy, we argue that there have been 
improvements in other policies through the learning process promoted among regional 
firms and policy-makers in the cluster policy framework. Basque CAs have maintained a 
close relationship with the DITT of the Basque Government, who has developed a matrix of 
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‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ technicians to attend the meetings of the CAs. Vertical technicians 
have a general vision of the sector in which each CA operates, and horizontal technicians 
have a general vision of each strategic area (innovation, internationalization, quality). The 
knowledge developed among technicians can provide orientation on critical issues for each 
cluster. Also, the government develops direct knowledge about the main problems, 
activities and relationships in each sector and each area, which is a valuable input in 
designing industry policy in a whole range of other areas. For example, this matrix structure 
was crucial for the definition and implementation of the Innova-cooperation programme, 
which was launched to support cooperative innovation projects in 2008. As a result, this 
programme has generated space for bottom-up defined innovation projects. 
 
Indeed, a main conclusion of ARANGUREN and NAVARRO’s (2003) study was that while 
the direct effects of the policy were difficult to measure in terms of competitive upgrading, 
two positive effects were detected: First, the adaptation of other policies to the real needs of 
firms; and second, an improvement in the level of knowledge among firms about public 
policies. Related to this argument around the impact of cluster policies in improving the 
efficiency of other policies, ARANGUREN et al. (2010) argue that new governance models 
guided by transparency are converging with various public policies interacting in the same 
territory. So, from the very first moment, evaluation processes pursuing the better 
integration of policies can help to generate constant feedback for the agents that will 
improve the real outcomes of the various specific policies (NAUWELAERS and WINTJES, 
2008; BORRÁS and TSAGDIS, 2008). 
 
Other kinds of important benefits that cluster policies generate and are not captured by 
empirical analyses are the effects on building trust and social capital. These are key 
elements for sustained competitiveness in a territory, but take considerable time to build 
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and develop impacts in more tangible areas. For instance, in the context of the Basque 
cluster policy, ITURRIOZ et al. (2006) and ARANGUREN et al. (2008) analyse the 
perceptions of CA members in the Paper cluster on the extent to which intangible outputs 
(networking, social capital and cooperation in strategic projects) and tangible results 
(improvements in firm competitiveness) were being reached. They conclude that although 
80% of the association members agreed that the activities developed in the association had 
influenced their competitiveness, only 10% valued such impact as high or very high. 
However 70% of members agreed that the association had facilitated cooperation, 
generated trust and helped to share knowledge and experiences. These are behavioural 
additionalities that over time can be harnessed to support competitiveness additionalities, 
and have been the focus in the development of a social capital approach for policy learning 
applied to the aeronautics cluster (ARAGÓN et al., 2012). 
 
3. There could be a range of other problems related to the limitations of the available 
indicators in understanding complex behaviour and relationships. 
 
It is considered that the associated firms are the beneficiaries of the policy. However, the 
aims that the associated firms pursue when they associate to a CA are not evident. If their 
motivations are based on their real interest for the potential that cooperation has for their 
competitiveness, and consequently they act proactively in the association, then their 
membership is more likely to have an impact on competitiveness. In contrast, if the 
members do not believe in cooperation and join primarily because others did or because 
policy-makers put pressure on them, one might expect membership to have a lower effect 
on competitiveness. Thus different and hidden motivations may produce differentiated 
effects that are impossible for an empirical analysis to capture. 
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In the case of the Basque Paper Cluster, for example, ITURRIOZ et al. (2006) conclude that 
associated firms who believed cooperation to be strategic to increase their competitiveness 
both had higher values in social capital indicators and perceived that the CA effect on their 
competitiveness was higher. Meanwhile, those members that had no clear motivations for 
membership had lower levels of social capital and perceptions on impacts on 
competitiveness. Similar findings are also evident from a participative evaluation process 
with Basque Aeronautics cluster (ARAGÓN et al., 2012). Thus in making an evaluation of 
the policy we should not consider all members as the same, because the effect of the cluster 
policy on supported-firms’ competitiveness does not depend only on the payment of a quota 
(which is the only obligation of a member), but also on the propensity to participate actively 
in the CA activities. Behavioural aspects are critical, yet unfortunately it is very difficult to 
uncover and integrate such information in an empirical study such as that conducted in 
section 4. 
 
Indeed, improvement in competitiveness could be measured with different indicators. In 
our case we have used improvement in value-added per employee. However the policy can 
also have intermediate impacts on firm behaviour with regards internationalisation, 
innovation, quality and training, through projects in which the CAs take the role of 
cooperation facilitators. While we have included these behavioural indicators in the 
empirical analysis, the indicators available are severely limited. For example we only know 
whether or not a firm conducts R&D, rather than how much they conduct, or whether or not 
they have obtained quality certificates. We also have no data on firm behaviour with regard 
to internationalisation. 
 
Finally, in line with our statistical analysis, DE LA MAZA et al. (2008) also illustrate that 
the likelihood of CA membership is significantly correlated with firm size, and that larger 
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firms are more likely to invest in R&D and have quality certificates, etcetera. So it seems 
that the cluster policy includes mostly larger firms, and does not extend well to smaller 
firms. This is difficult to control for in our quantitative analysis, given that the dependent 
variable is constructed from a size variable (employment). Moreover it is linked to our 
earlier argument regarding the problems of inferring causality in such policies, where there 




In this paper we have illustrated and explored the methodological challenges in evaluating 
soft, relationship-oriented policies. Our contribution has focussed specifically on an 
empirical and contextual examination of one of the longest-standing cluster policies, that of 
the Basque Country region in Spain. 
  
Our empirical analysis presented a statistical overview of the characteristics and 
performance of two groups of industrial firms; those that associated to CAs (and have been 
supported by the cluster policy), and those that have not. In particular, associated firms 
demonstrate superior levels and growth of productivity, and appear more likely to have 
obtained quality certificates and to have invested in R&D. An econometric analysis using 
two different sample methodologies – ‘full sample’ and ‘matched sub-sample’ – shows 
mixed results across different models and time periods. Overall we can say that there is 
weak evidence that the cluster policy has had a positive impact on firm-level productivity.   
 
While the results support the existence of additionality associated with the policy to a 
limited extent, their nuanced nature urges caution in using this statistical analysis in 
isolation to evaluate the policy. Indeed the primary purpose of the paper is not to make an 
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empirical evaluation of this specific policy, but rather to illustrate and explore the inherent 
difficulties in evaluating cluster policies. Using context-specific knowledge of the policy in 
question, we have undertaken a complementary qualitative analysis that has highlighted 
and clarified the limitations of the empirical analysis. As such the paper responds to an 
important need in the evaluation of cluster policies, showing how traditional empirical 
techniques can be usefully integrated with qualitative, contextual elements capable of 
viewing the policy from a wider perspective. Due to the limitations in indicators and 
datasets, but mainly to analytical difficulties in establishing simple cause-effect 
relationships in systemic, relationship-oriented policies, it is crucial to nest different 
methodological approaches to the evaluation of such policies in this way. 
 
In this sense we argue that the empirical analysis conducted here should be treated as an 
important input in a wider reflection among policy stake-holders in the Basque Country, 
alongside a range of more qualitative studies, including case studies of the actual processes 
occurring in specific cluster associations (ARAGÓN et al., 2012a, 2012b). 
  
More generally our analysis raises a number of key issues for future research around the 
evaluation and impacts of cluster policies. In particular it suggests the importance of 
combining a statistical overview of firm-related and observable outcomes with: (i) a detailed 
understanding of the actual policy itself, and in particular of where it fits in the overall 
system of policies that co-exist in a specific territory; and (ii) detailed case analysis that is 
capable of uncovering further information around firm behaviour and motivation with 
respect to the policy. Only by doing this in the context of each policy it is possible to 
counter-balance the limitations of both the data and the suitability of statistical techniques 




1. Cluster policies are a type of public policy that target the promotion of clusters in specific 
geographical contexts. In the context of the Basque Country, the focus of the empirical part 
of this paper, cluster policies take the form of the creation of cluster associations that 
promote the development of joint member initiatives in key areas such as innovation, 
quality and internationalisation. 
2. For a methodological overview of the evaluation of cluster policies see SCHMIEDEBERG 
(2010). 
3.  See Table 3 for an explanation of variables. 
4. Results are omitted here due to space considerations but can be obtained upon request. 
The variables are described in the following section. 
5. This variable is measured through two indicators: 1) SECAGG, which captures 
agglomeration economies based on sector concentration; 2) INDAGG, which captures 
agglomeration economies based on concentration in the four industrial parks in the Basque 
Country. 
6. Internationalization could not be included due to lack of appropriate data. 
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Table 1: Cluster Associations of the Basque Country 
Cluster Association Created Members Coordinated by 
Home Appliances 1992 11 Dept. of Industry 
 
Machine-tools 1992 94 Dept. of Industry 
 
Automotive 1993 90 Dept. of Industry 
 
Environment 1995 93 Dept. of Industry 
 
Energy 1996 78 Dept. of Industry 
 
Telecommunications 1996 238 Dept. of Industry 
 
Port of Bilbao 1997 151 Dept. of Industry 
 
Maritime 1997 192 Dept. of Industry 
 
Aeronautics 1997 36 Dept. of Industry 
 
Paper 1998 20 Dept. of Industry 
 
Audiovisual 2004 54 Dept. of Industry 
 
Transports&Logistics 2005 88 Dept. of Transport 
 























SECTOR1 Food, drink and tobacco 15, 16 
SECTOR2 Textiles 17, 18, 19 
SECTOR3 Wood and paper 20, 21, 22, 36 
SECTOR4 Petro-chemicals 23, 24 
SECTOR5 Plastics and minerals 25, 26 
SECTOR6 Metals 27, 28 
SECTOR7 Industrial equipment, information and electronics 29, 30, 31, 32, 33  
SECTOR8 Recycling 37 
SECTOR9 Energy and Water 40, 41 
SECTOR10 Transport 49, 50, 51, 52, 53 
SECTOR 11 Audiovisual 59, 60, 61 
 
 





Table 3: Explanation of Variables 
VARIABLE SHORT NAME AREA TYPE EXPLANATION 
Labour Productivity level 
 
PRODUCTIVITY 










Dummy: 1 CA member; 0 
non-member 
Agglomeration in 





Index = [(Ratio: industry 
firms in county)/(Ratio: 
industry firm in Basuqe 
Country)] 




Number of firms doing 







Index =[(Ratio: sector 
firms in county)/(Ratio: 
sector firm in Basuqe 
Country)] 
Techonolgy management R&D POLICY AREA Independent 




TMQ POLICY AREA Independent 




EMQ POLICY AREA Independent 
Dummy, 1 doing EMQ; 0 
non-EMQ 
Cost per employee in 
manufacturing firms 
LABCOST FIRM Independent  
GDP per county GDPPC FIRM Independent  




FIRM Control Dummy 
Cooperative LEGAL-COOP FIRM Control Dummy 
Other LEGAL-OTHER FIRM Control Dummy 
Number of employees in 
2002 
EMP2002 FIRM Control  
Age of the firm since 
creation in 2002 
AGE2002 FIRM Control  
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Table 4: Summary Statistics for CA and Non-CA firms (2002 and 2008) for the total and matched samples 
 TOTAL SAMPLE MATCHING  SUB-SAMPLE 
Variable Mean CA firms (176 
firms) 
Mean non CA firm 
(5349 firms) 
Mean CA firm (120 
firms) 
Mean non CA firm 
(120 firms) 
Employment 2002 89.80952    
(135.7756) 
24.09572    
(96.22744) 
86.87603    
(133.9032) 
117.0579     
(486.8985) 





    (244.0596) 
114.7438   
   (430.964) 
Productivity 2002 
(thousands of euros) 
66417.61    
(83102.06) 
49191.41    
(129245.6) 
67073.93    
(84475.62) 
74347.81    
(152873.4) 
Productivity 2008 
(thousands of euros) 
97175.86    
(323143.8) 
47150.1      
(135080.9) 
100424.9    
(329350.3) 




30735.38    
(255070.8) 
-1283.796    
(120685.9) 
33327.87    
(259743.4) 




0.2469975    
(1.675749) 
0.215822    
(3.948444) 
0.2702284    
(1.698208) 






1.618258    
(3.477684) 
1.364963    
(0.8171688) 




1.360869    
(0.8258885) 
1.70524      
(3.889788) 
1.385825    
(0.8366609) 






1.091686    
(0.2919163) 
1.078819    
(0.2194203) 




1.076718    
(0.2189311) 
1.100266    
(0.3058015) 
1.078819    
(0.2194203) 
1.064939    
(0.2123224) 
R&D performance .6590909    
(0.6909433) 
.087306    
(0.2823094) 
0.625        
(0.6359338) 




.6022727    
(0.5764873) 
.1546083    
(0.3777514) 
0.575        
(0.5892953) 




.2840909    
(0.5746823) 
.0334642    
(0.2014392) 
0.25          
(0.4348283) 
0.25          
(0.5225985) 
Age of the firm in 2002 19.53409    
(14.46252) 
12.4337       
(11.17664) 
18.89167    
(14.63896) 
20.73333    
(16.22413) 
Labour Cost per 
Employee (2008) 
32764.89      
(2309.37) 
32625         
(2187.427) 
32795.54    
(2335.618) 
32693.03    
(2339.724) 
R&D firms per county 
(2008) 
.7974882    
(0.4587098) 
.7759905    
(0.4389258) 
0.79875      
(0.4602615) 
.7449583    
(0.4244195) 
GDP per county (2008) 31582.82    
(4129.539) 
32870.95      
(6304.94) 
31515.99    
(4108.203) 
30979.85    
(3954.954) 
 
Standard Deviation in Parenthesis. 













Table 5: Total Sample Regressions 
 
 
Level of statistical significance: *** 1%, ** 5%. Robust Standard errors in parenthesis. For Legal Categorical 
variables we use as a reference group LEGAL-PC. In the Main model we omitted the results concerning sector 
categorical variables. In the selection model we omitted sector and county categorical variables. 



















Productivity Level (2002) 
 
OLS 
Productivity Level (2008) 
 
HECKMAN 
Absolute Change Productivity 
(2002-2008) 
HECKMAN 
Relative Change Productivity 
(2002-2008) 
HECKMAN 
PRODUCTIVITY (2002) - - -31850.75   (6910.491)*** - 
CLUSTER 0.126645   (0.0546703)** 0.1991121   (0.0680074)*** 136790.2   (26508.46)*** 2.029182   (.5571858)*** 
SECAGG 0.0131957   (0.0036213)*** 0.0131045   (0.0037708)*** -809.0435    (1439.15) -0.0302251   (0.0307943) 
INDAGG 0.131443   (0.0838244) -0.1204316   (0.0629817) 7517.007   24158.03 -0.2068405   0.5109007 
R&DCOUNT - -0.0209989   (0.0392948) 6907.579   (15196.29) 0.6667616   (0.3204283)** 
LABCOST  0.7820038   (0.1866901)*** 470.5148   (72445.28) -1.363747   (1.520258) 
GDPPC  0.2360569   (0.0973983)** 13584.17   (38248.97)  1.384597    (.806304) 
R&D 0.0917459   (0.0208746)*** 0.1481729   (0.0388845) *** -12099.46   (14652.36) -.3107275   (0.3158703) 
TMQ 0.1253969   (0.0243324)*** 0.0833129   (0.0296925)*** -4085.483   (11190.22) -.2036254    (0.241584) 
EMQ 0.2088809   (0.0428216)*** 0.1848115   (0.0521633)*** -25598.26   (19820.77) -.4459853    (0.425851) 
LEGAL-PLC -0.2071577   (0.0217903)*** -0.1409415   (0.0246235)*** 8718.305   (9393.785) .4097968   (0.2006239)** 
LEGAL-COOP -0.2813836   (0.0880041)*** -1.067878   (0.2827518)*** -74438.1   (107422.1) -1.71285   (2.318955) 
LEGAL-OTHER 0.3237605   (0.0368256)*** 0.0427742   (0.6236249) 9692.079   (236727.3) 0.0582914   (5.115704) 
CONSTANT 10.46423   (0.1007892)*** 0.0610984   (0.2507504) 229891.9   (846820.7) -0.0983824   (17.83086) 
CLUSTER - 0.2396** (0.1049) 0.2555** (0.1057) 0.2555** (0.1057) 
AGE AT 2002 - 0.0032** (0.0015) 0.0030** (0.0015) 0.0030** (0.0015) 
LABOUR AT 2002 - -0.0008 (0.001) -0.0006 (0.0016) -0.0006 (0.0016) 
CONSTANT - 0.0611 (0.2507) 0.1788 (0.2517) 0.1788 (0.2517) 
MILLS LAMBDA - -0.02289 (0.1907) -83340.01 (70834.11) 1.119 (1.517) 
R-Squared 0.1131 0.1219 0.0607 0.0516 
Observations 5525 5525 5525 5525 
Censored Obs 0 2093 2093 2093 
Uncensored Obs 5525 3432 3432 3432 
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Table 6: Matched Sub-Sample Regression 
 
 
Level of statistical significance: *** 1%, ** 5%. Robust Standard errors in parenthesis. For Legal Categorical 
variables we use as a reference group LEGAL-PC. We omitted the results concerning sector categorical variables 












Productivity Level (2002) 
 
OLS 
Productivity Level (2008) 
 
OLS 
Absolute Change Productivity 
(2002-2008) 
OLS 
Relative Change Productivity 
(2002-2008) 
OLS 
PRODUCTIVITY (2002) - - -127667.8   (249855.5) - 
CLUSTER 0.0762188    (0.064834) 0.2751998      (0.1134)** 181702.5   (107724.7) 2.341045    (1.64786) 
SECAGG -0.0739122    (0.031082)** -0.0438427   (0.0518549) -83340.35   (83348.33) -1.269166   (1.033238) 
INDAGG  .5167454   (0.1133004)*** 0.1356881   (0.2026466) 717577.8   (445056.1) 11.24779   (5.859401) 
R&DCOUNT  0.0163377   (0.0692279) 57722.82   (76421.42) 1.029072   (1.068527) 
LABCOST  0.4700288   (0.2627074) -806814.6   (379590.3) -14.62238   (5.569728)** 
GDPPC  -0.1349679   (0.1087063) 582048.8   (248945.3)** 9.475191   (3.795523)** 
R&D 0.1137998   (0.0472617)** 0.240798   (0.0644479)** -53499.94   (54207.06) -0.7911676   (1.514126) 
TMQ 0.001639   (0.0223217) -0.0337848   (0.0514802) -15358.65   (42526.91) -0.7166057    (0.448759) 
EMQ 0.3068834   (0.0414588)*** 0.1446805   (0.1305522) -176611.3   (91132.21) -3.660933   (2.627192) 
LEGAL-PLC -0.1448638   (0.0471336)*** -0.0330312   (0.0455159) 107097.6   (41602.78)** 1.496909   (1.221162) 
LEGAL-COOP -0.4546674   (0.0564471)*** -0.4059245   (0.1584067)** -83919.31   (77150.54) -0.2254247   (2.323611) 
LEGAL-OTHER (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
CONSTANT 10.17122   (11.39798) 6.913178**   (3.008208) 30.15694    (37.62014) 43.29566   (65.38855) 
R-Squared 0.3467 0.6151 .2357 .1845 
Observations 240 240 240 240 
